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1 Framing the debate on Islam 
and human rights 
Shahram Akbarzadeh and 
Benjamin MacQueen 
Is Islam compatible with human rights? This fundamental question has 
generated a large body of literature addressing the question from different, 
often opposing, positions. The literalist reading of Islam emphasises the 
gaps between the limits of tolerance and acceptability in the Quran and 
Hadith on the one hand, and internationally-sanctioned standards for 
human rights. The status of women and religious freedom are often the 
two key area of contention. This approach, for example, highlights 
specific passages in the Quran that articulate the position of women in 
matters of legal judgment, inheritance and in the family setting. The 
impression of an unequal standing for men and women in these matters is 
inescapable. What is more, inequality can turn into something much 
graver as issues relating to religious freedom bring into question the 
physical safety of Muslims who may wish to leave Islam (Saeed & Saeed 
2004). Leaving the faith is condemned as apostasy and is punishable by 
death. Taking away life is the ultimate punishment, and in direct violation 
of the right to life. In a literalist reading of Islam, there is little room to 
negotiate human rights, as clear injunctions contravene the normative 
framework of the international human rights regime. 
It is perhaps ironic that the literalist reading of Islam has been adopted 
by two very distinct groups. On the one hand some traditionalist Muslim 
leaders, as well as Islamists, have taken up a hostile attitude toward the 
idea of a human rights regime because that is seen as nothing more than a 
cover for a neo~colonial attempt at regaining domination over the Muslim 
world by Western powers. The fact that the normative framework of the 
human rights regime emerged in the halls of the United Nations where 
Western powers tend to set the agenda is seen as proof by the human rights 
sceptics of a Western conspiracy. And the principles enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights were seen as contravening the 
Shari'a. Accordingly, this Declaration (adopted in 1948 by the United Nations) 
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was rejected by Saudi Arabia as un-Islamic (Morsink 1999; Mayer 1999).1 
This perspective is shared by groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the 
trans-national Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir which argue that Islamic 
junctions in the text are perfect and eternal. 2 Adopting anything that con-
tradicts or deviates from them, therefore, is forbidden. 
The above position rests on the belief that the Quran and Hadith are 
immutable. Emphasising the timeless and eternal nature o{ Islamic 
junctions presents a challenge for its application in the contemporary era, 
some fourteen centuries after their articulation. In the literalist approach, 
this challenge is dismissed as irrelevant while insisting that holy injunctions 
cannot be continuously modified to suit changing times. Doing so, they 
may argue, would devoid Islam of its content and leave an empty shell. 
Indeed some Islamists use the very point regarding the temporal modifi-
cation of Islam to criticise ruling regimes. For example, the famous father 
ofislamism Sayed Qutb, rejected the Egyptian regime for allowing society 
to astray from the path of Islam and permitting Islam to be contaminated 
by contemporary influences (Khatab 2002). 
In a mirror image of this literalist approach to Islam and human rights, 
critics have presented the two as poles apart and insisted on the incapacity 
of Islam to reform itself. Authors such as Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes 
have argued that Islam contradicts modern human rights norms and 
conventions as it reflects the norms and conventions of the seventh-
century civilisation of Arabia. In an ironic twist, they add their voice to 
the literalist Islamic approach by insisting on the static nature of Islam. 
For instance, Lewis has argued that there is an inherent resistance to 
democratic governance as the notion of a 'corporate or majority decision' 
through electoral means is an 'alien' concept in many Islamic societies, 
with violent contestations, in this view, seen as the norm (2005: 36). 
Echoing the literalist approach to Islam, Lewis insists on the incompati-
bility of Islam and modernity. 
Resonating such a theme, Daniel Pipes, former appointee by the Bush 
Administration to the United States Institute of Peace, leads the charge in 
seeking to highlight what he claims is the 'historically-abiding Muslim 
imperative to subjugate non-Muslim peoples' (2006). The conclusion 
Pipes draws is that 'ultimately, there is no compromise' with Muslim 
communities and what he sees as the inherent absolutist drive of the 
religion, one that, in his own words, asks the question of whether 'the West 
[will] stand up for its customs and mores, including freedom of speech, or will 
Muslims impose their way of life on the West?' (Pipes 2006). The literalist 
correlation between these two groups is a profound irony, however, one 
that appears lost on such ideologues. 
Framing the debate on Islam and human rights 3 
The literalist approach to Islam has not gone unchallenged. Abdullah 
Saeed, among others, has argued that there is nothing certain and undeniable 
about the literalist approach. The text, the holy book of Qurim, is a compilation 
of disparate versus that where revealed to Prophet Muhammad over more 
than two decades. Often they referred to specific cases and could be seen 
as contradictory. How is one verse to be given precedence over the next? 
Reading the text invariably involves a certain degree of interpretation and 
choice. According to Saeed, there is nothing certain in the certainly 
claimed by the literalist readers of the text (2006: 153). In recognising 
that, Saeed advocates recognition of human agency and an acknowledg-
ment of the context to help give meaning to the text. Such contextulisation 
offers new opportunities for exploring the relevance of Islam to contemporary 
conditions and the challenges faced by Muslims today. 
The above recommendation holds significant promise on the question 
of compatibility between Islam and human rights. An increasing number 
of Muslim thinkers in modem times have tried to move away from ideological 
rigidity, emphasising instead the essence and core values embedded in the 
holy text., In this perspective, restrictions on women and religious freedom 
which are conventionally applied in most Muslims societies, are challenged 
as contradictory to the essence of Islam. Accordingly, Islam is seen to be 
founded on the principle of unity between God and the humankind; piety 
and personal devotions are key to the ideal Islamic state. This approach 
places the individual, the Muslim believer, as the conscious actor on the 
centre stage, and may therefore be called the humanist approach. In this 
vein Ali Abootalebi, a former associate of the Iranian President 
Muhammad Khatami, has argued in favour of 'freedom of thought and 
expression, including freedom from government control and suppression' 
(1999). In this approach, state-imposed gender segregation and dress 
code policing which directly affect women in Iran and Saudi Arabia are 
dismissed as over-zealous interpretations of the faith. 
Similarly, authors such as Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im have argued for 
the religious neutrality of the state in Muslim communities. For An-Na'im, 
Islamic thought can be injected with renewed vitality and flexibility 
through the process of ijtihad as a means to maximise the ability of 
Muslims to exercise their human agency (2000: 96). In other words, this 
perspective focuses on the need for Muslim communities to reconcile with 
the human rights regime, not to manipulate the concept of human rights to 
further particular social interests. This allows for Muslim communities to 
engage with the human rights regime on their own terms. This also helps 
undermine the view of human rights as a 'Western' concept imposed on 
Muslim communities. This approach contains significant implications for 
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the idealised Islamic state. In the words of Khaled Abou El Fadl, the 
Quran 'does not specify a particular form of government' (2004: 5). In a 
direct challenge to the literalist reading of Islam, especially that adopted 
by Islamist groups, El Fadl insists on the importance of values: justice, 
consultative government, mercy and compassion are essential values for 
Muslim policy. 
The humanist approach in Islam offers significant promise, n9t only in 
Muslim majority societies enthused by the prospects of establishing an 
Islamic state but also for the Muslim diaspora. One of the challenging 
features of globalisation in the latter part of the twentieth century has been 
the movement of a significant number of people from the Muslim world 
to territories that have traditionally been regarded as foreign. Muslim 
settlements in Europe, the United States, and in subsequent years Canada 
and Australia, have presented difficult questions to migrant communities 
and their hosts regarding the precedence of one rule over another. In other 
words, to what extent should Muslim minorities in the West follow and 
obey secular law? In the literalist perspective, the dichotomy of Shari' a 
versus secular law is absolute. But the humanist approach to Islam moves 
beyond the apparent dichotomy and questions the assumed contradiction 
between the two. Tariq Ramadan, perhaps the best known author on this 
matter, has argued that the Western-style secular law is very much inspired 
by the same core values that rest at the heart of Islam. Writing on the 
question of being a good citizen and a Muslim in Europe, Ramadan has 
emphasised the principles of fairness, equity and justice as common to 
Islamic jurisprudence and secular law (which is ironically inspired by 
Judea-Christian traditions). Consequently, he sees no contradictions 
between the two (Ramadan 1999, 2002). 
In this approach, Muslims in the West can abide by secular rules that 
govern their country of adoption without fear of violating Islamic principles. 
The liberal and tolerant nature of European states facilitates this interpre-
tation because it allows significant freedoms to individuals to pursue their 
interests, beliefs and traditions. In other words, individual liberties 
enshrined in liberal democracies off er sanctuary to the Muslim diaspora. 
It is important to note here that Western liberal democracies meet the qualifi-
cations set out by El Fadl for legitimate political authority. In some cases, 
however, the humanist position on the compatibility of secular law and 
Islamic principles faces serious challenges, as became evident in France 
under the new law banning hijab at schools. This ban, which came into 
force in 2004 appeared to reverse the tolerant traditions of France and 
put Muslim girls wearing hij ab and their families in a difficult dilemma: 
either remove the hijab to attend school or keep the hijab and be excluded 
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from public education. Some French Muslims have responded by weighing 
the costs and benefits of the alternatives and opted to stay in the education 
system, even ifthat means removing the hijab.3 For most French Muslims, 
however, that is not an acceptable compromise. 
Islamic reformism which is at the heart of the humanist approach is still 
in its infancy and stumbling from one challenge to the next (Piscatori 
2002). An ongoing issue that is still to be addressed by reformist thinkers 
in Islam is the position of non-Muslims in Muslim societies. To what 
extent does the humanist interpretation of Islam, which emphasises the 
intrinsic values of individual piety and freedom to pursue a personal path 
to divinity may be applied to non-Muslim individuals and minority 
groups? More specifically, what role is set aside for non-Muslims in 
Muslim majority states? 
The question of compatibility between Islam and human rights in 
Muslim majority states is an urgent and topical issue, partly because most 
such states in the Middle East suffer under the yoke of authoritarian rule 
while the United States has made democracy promotion and protection of 
human rights its top mission in this oil-rich region. The most immediate 
beneficiaries of any move towards greater freedoms tend to be Islamist 
groups in opposition, which might explain why the latter has adopted 
a conciliatory (sometimes enthusiastic) position towards human rights, 
freedom and democracy. 
Appeals to values of liberalism and human rights by Islamist groups 
have precipitated a debate in policy and academic circles about the 
relationship between political expediency and principles. Are Islamists 
using human rights as a pretext to push their own agenda that is inherently 
intolerant and totalitarian? Or in the words of Neil Hicks, Director of the 
Human Rights Defenders' Protection Initiative at the Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights in New York 'is it conceivable that we might have 
human rights activists who are Islamists, that is to say Islamist human 
rights activists?' (Hicks 2002: 362). There are no easy answers to these 
questions, which helps explain why the debate appears to go round and 
round with no end in sight. One response that is often favoured in Western 
policy circles is that Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah or the 
Muslim Brotherhood are only interested in human rights because they 
draw immediate benefits from them. There is no doubt that an effective 
protection of human rights, which entails the promotion of individual 
liberties, offers direct benefit to Islamist groups that have been pushed to 
the margin by authoritarian regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is 
ready to burst out on the political scene the minute Hosni Mubarak's 
regime loosens its grip on power. Observers witnessed a taste of things to 
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come if Egypt opted for political openness and protection of civil liberties 
when the banned Muslim Brotherhood managed to register strong results 
in the 2006 municipal elections. Egypt's flirtation with contested elections, 
however, appears to have been short lived - especially when faced with the 
embarrassing prospects of electoral defeat. In this, Hosni Mubarak has the 
tacit approval of the US Administration. 
The Palestinian experience of2006 has served as a reminder of the risks 
political openness could pose to ruling regimes. The surprising Hamas 
victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections brought to office 
an Islamist group that was more known for its zeal against Israel than 
a commitment to human rights and democratic principles. Hamas was the 
obvious beneficiary of two related processes in the Palestinian society: 
a record of nepotism and incompetence by the Palestinian Authority and 
a broad desire among Palestinians for international recognition through a 
public demonstration of commitment to democracy. The landslide victory 
of Hamas, however, presented the international community with a difficult 
choice. The decision to break off ties, and more importantly aid to, the 
Hamas-dominated Palestinian Authority by the United States and the 
European Union was justified in terms of not-dealing with terrorists. 
As far as Western policy makers were concerned, the fact that Hamas had 
gained power through the ballot box was immaterial. What was critical 
was the belief that Hamas was genocidal towards Jews and had no interest 
in promoting democracy and human rights (Akbarzadeh, 2006). 
The international boycott on Hamas had a devastating impact on the 
livelihood of the Palestinian population, which in turn intensified the 
rivalry between Hamas and Fatah culminating in the June 2007 take over 
of Gaza Strip by Hamas militia and the collapse of the faltering coalition 
government. The critics may have been right in arguing that Hamas would 
not play by the rules, and not respect the imperatives of popular will. But 
Hamas did not get a chance to prove them right. 
The presumption that Islamists value the ballot box only once, ie. when 
they gain power through elections, has led some analysts to dismiss them 
as political charlatans who deserve to be kept out of the democratic 
system. In relation to Muslim Brotherhood, Katerina Dalacoura suggests, 
they defend human rights 'because they are concerned with protecting 
their own rights, as individuals and as an organisation. They also defend 
rights because they are intent on presenting a picture of a moderate and 
respectable movement' (2007: 128). In contrast, other observers have 
pointed to the modifying effects of participation in the open political 
process of winning votes. Respect for rule of law, human rights and civil 
liberties may not be the primary motivating factor for Islamists. Indeed, these 
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principles may be of peripheral interest to Islamist groups that are driven 
by a utopian desire to institutionalise an Islamic state. Yet the fact that the 
idealised Islamic state remains a 'work in progress', and Islamists often 
find themselves facing the constrains and imperatives of government once 
in power suggest that they are not as closed to democratic rule as they are 
assumed to be. In fact as Olivier Roy has pointed out, Islamists and conser-
vative Muslims feel compelled to use the language of human rights to justify 
their political ambitions (Roy 2004: 32). The key question is whether this 
practical adoption of human rights discourse translates into a conceptual 
rethinking of the relationship between Islam and human rights. 
Reconciling Islamic rule with the principles of human rights and 
democratic governance cannot be an overnight achievement, especially 
when it involves fundamental questions about the worth of the individual. 
As it turns out the conceptual realignment to reconcile Islam and human 
rights tends to lag behind empirical cases. The Turkish experience, for 
example, offers a sustained case where religiously-inclined politicians 
continue to conduct themselves with due respect for human rights and 
democratic rule. In the 1990s, under the leadership ofNec;mettin Erbakan 
the Refah Party managed to secure an electoral victory in 1995 (Yavuz 
1997). For the first time in modern Turkish history an Islamic party won 
power. Although this electoral victory was short-lived, because the Turkish 
military stepped in to curb what it viewed as a direct threat to Atatiirk 's 
heritage of secularism, it did signify a major development. Refah's 
performance was later emulated by a successor party. The Justice and 
Development Party which won office in 2002 and again in 2007 has tried 
to remain faithful to the Islamic heritage of Turkey and bring back Islam 
into the public domain without violating rule of law and democratic 
conventions. These practical steps towards uniting Islam and democratic 
governance and human rights, however, have yet to be digested and 
conceptualised by observers. 
Addressing the gap between the reality of diverse Muslim experiences 
with human rights and the conceptualisation of these experiences governs 
this volume. Starting with the lived experiences, contributors to this 
volume explore the relationship between Islam and human right devoting 
special attention to key issues of gender equality and freedom of religion. 
The intense examination of women's rights in Islamic thought has given 
rise to a vibrant debate that is challenging to previously entrenched modes 
of thought. Such dynamism, according to Ann Elizabeth Mayer, has led to 
the reformulation of the bases of enquiry into women's rights and their 
relationship to the sources of Islamic law, a shift away from a reliance on 
juristic interpretations to define and determine rights and privileges in 
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Muslim communities. This is reflective of a broader trend whereby discussion 
on women's rights in Muslim communities is accommodating a diversity 
of voices, most notably Muslim women's voices. In this milieu, new 
alliances are emerging between women's rights activists, intellectuals and 
Islamic scholars and jurists who are contesting and reformulating the very 
bases of Islamic thought on the rights and roles of men and women in 
Muslim communities. 
.. 
An illustration of this can be found in the challenge to established 
gender norms in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In particular, resistance to 
the officially-sanctioned discriminatory regime pertaining to gender rights 
in Iran, one largely based on a conflation of biological differences 
and social roles, has not only persisted since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
but gained ground in recent years. Here, Rebecca Barlow outlines both a 
religious and secular-oriented approach to securing equal, universal and 
inalienable rights for Muslim women. Religious-oriented feminists in Iran 
argue for a review of the sources of Islamic law that is consciously 
women-centric as a means to balance to the prevailing patriarchal under-
standings present in Iran and many other Muslim communities. 
However, according to Barlow, this endeavour is inherently limited as it 
has not been able to meaningfully alter Iran's prevailing status quo in 
terms of gender-based and broader political and social norms in Iran. 
Alternatively, secular-oriented feminists present a more "anti-systemic" 
approach to women's rights, seeking to operate apart from the touchstones 
of legitimacy in the Islamic republic, namely, focussing not on reform of 
Islamic doctrine per se, but looking at global debates and the development 
of universal norms related to human rights as the basis from which to 
develop equitable gender rights and roles in Muslim communities. This is 
illustrative of the diversity of voices from within Muslim communities 
and how approaches to key questions related to human rights are tackled 
in a myriad of ways. 
Gender rights, alongside religious freedom, are crucial elements in the 
discussion over the possibilities for synergy or divergence between Islam 
and human rights. These issues are often presented as examples of 
a potential mutual exclusivity between Islam and prevailing global human 
rights norms. The modes of engagement examined above belie this assertion. 
However, what is also essential is the active support of these issues by 
effective social and political organisations. This is a highly problematic 
task in situations of political and social turmoil. Here, Iraq is particularly 
vulnerable to these pressures, particularly since the 2003 US-led invasion 
and occupation where the state and society has been in a caught in a cycle 
of violent social discord. 
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The new political space that was opened after the removal of the 
Saddam Hussein regime raised the possibility for new and inclusive 
approaches to the questions of gender rights and religious freedom to be 
enshrined in the new Iraqi constitution. In spite of this, the volatile political 
and security situation has put the prospect for this in real jeopardy. In par-
ticular, Benjamin MacQueen and Shahram Akbarzadeh highlight how the 
new Iraqi constitution has fallen victim to the sectarian tensions that now 
characterise the political landscape of the country and its new political 
institutions. This has affected the status of gender rights and religious freedom 
in the new Iraq constitution in terms of an abandonment of universal 
personal status law in favour of the implementation of community and 
sectarian legal codes as a means for keeping the various sectarian leaders 
involved in the political process. 
This highlights the vulnerability of human rights and human rights 
activists in Muslim communities as they not only face entrenched forces 
resistant to such change, but also the volatilities of regional and global 
political influences that tend to have an amplified affect in Muslim 
communities, particularly in the context of the post-11 September global 
environment. A corollary of this relates to the lack of political freedoms 
in a number of Muslim states, particularly those in the Middle East and 
North Africa region. Despite its questionable intellectual basis and selective 
application, the democracy promotion policy of President George W Bush 
has thrown the spotlight on the lack of democratic freedoms and traditions 
in this largely Muslim region. The squeezing of political space by autocratic 
regimes has seen the emergence of new political alliances, drawn together 
in opposition. 
The alliance between Egypt's Muslim Brotherhoo4 the single largest 
opposition movement to the regime of Hosni Mubarak, and human 
rights NGOs is representative of such a movement. However, Benjamin 
MacQueen illustrates how this relationship currently exists primarily as 
one of functional cooperation~ where the Muslim Brotherhood draws on 
the considerable legal assistance of human rights NGOs in their on-going 
struggle with the Mubarak regime, whilst the NGOs seek to use their 
relationship with the Brotherhood to buttress their negligible domestic 
popularity and support. This functional relationship, whilst potentially one 
that could mount a serious frontal challenge on Mubarak's grip on power, 
has not fully engaged with key ideological divisions between the two 
movements. The ability of both Islamist movements such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and human rights NGOs to forge deeper relationships in 
crucially important Muslim communities such as Egypt will be telling as 
to the potential for the development of movements that cannot only lever 
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open sorely needed political space, but do so in such a way that is both 
legitimate and inclusive. 
As the cases of Iran, Iraq and Egypt highlight, the presence of a robust 
rule of law backed by key institutions such as an independent judiciary 
and a functioning and representative state apparatus alongside social 
movements championing human rights are key elements in ensuring the 
enshrinement of civil, political and social rights as well as promoting 
dialogue, understanding and synthesis with Islamist movements and 
Islamic doctrine. It is the substance of this interaction which is crucial 
however, not merely the existence of rhetorical statements on co-operation 
between human rights movements and Islamist organisations. 
William Maley amply illustrates such a need in his examination of the 
discrepancies between the human rights protections enshrined in the new 
Afghan constitution and the lack of human rights protections for Afghan 
citizens. The violence and political vacuum faced by Afghanistan over the 
past three decades, issues exacerbated by consistent patterns of external 
intervention and invasion, have undermined the rule of law in the country. 
This situation persists today, where despite the commitment to a highly 
progressive form of human rights established in the new Afghan constitution 
(Qanun-e asasi), the human rights situation on the ground is uncertain at 
best. Indeed, Maley points to deeper difficulties of seeking to establish 
a human rights regime in post-conflict communities, a situation relevant 
to Afghanistan as it is to Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, even Lebanon and Algeria, 
where the need for political stability may require overlooking human 
rights abuses of figures and movements deemed vital for the establishment 
of a functioning state. 
Apart from the legacies of internal or regional conflicts, many Muslim 
states also have to contend with their colonial heritage; one that has left 
a legacy of multifaceted social divisions and states compelled to create, 
forcibly if needs be, forms of social and political unity. In this context, 
Shamsul A.B. urges observers to take note of the context in which particular 
debates concerning state formation, human rights, and Islamic identity 
compete and co-exist. This is not a claim of cultural relativism, quite the 
opposite. Instead, Shamsul A.B. uses the example of Malaysia's complex 
legal landscape, highlighting how a range of different legal systems have 
become embedded in various parts of this South-East Asian nation, affecting 
the way Malaysian citizens interact with ethnic identity, political authority, 
human rights, and claims to legitimacy referential to Islam. 
The issue of community diversity, particularly that of religious freedom 
and its enshrinement in the Malaysian constitution, is one of immense 
complexity and division, as revealed by Patricia Martinez. Indeed, a detailed 
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examination of the Malaysian case reveals how discussions over human 
rights and their relationship to Islamic doctrine, specifically through the 
lens of religious freedom in Malaysia, is one that is largely confined 
to elites who, whether defined as reformist or conservative, have been 
reticent to engage in a thoroughgoing dialogue. Outside elites, "ordinary'' 
people's perceptions vis-a-vis human rights issues are largely framed by 
personal experience, a mix of place, position, and heritage. 
Taking note of the specificity of context and its impacts on Islam and 
human rights, Greg Fealy examines the attitudes of Indonesian Islamist 
movements. Such an endeavour, whilst seemingly counter-intuitive, is an 
essential task in terms of fleshing out any discussion of Islam and human 
rights, particularly in light of the growth in support for such movements 
in recent decades. What is evident in the Indonesian case, particularly in 
reference to movements which seek a comprehensive implementation of 
the Shari' a in Indonesia, is the shaping of their views by feelings of threat 
and persecution, This has driven many of these groups to take a hard line 
on human rights issues, particularly those of religious freedom and gender 
equality. However, Fealy contends, this is a view that is lacking in intellectual 
depth and historical awareness, particularly in reference to Indonesia's 
rich tradition of religious pluralism and social organisation. 
As James Piscatori has noted the contribution of Islamic reform is 
inconclusive. There certainly are very clear indications that groups commit-
ted to an Islamic vision view the protection of human rights and aspects 
of liberal democracy to their advantage and would, therefore, promote 
them. To what extent is this opportunistic? Only time can tell. Meanwhile~ 
it is important to avoid deterministic conclusions about Islam and human 
right and acknowledge that Islam is a living and flexible religion that is 
(re-) interpreted by each generation. This vibrancy can only be a source of 
hope for the future. 
Notes 
It is interesting to note that the United States of America has also refused to join the 
international human rights regime. Washington's failure to sign the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is linked to the reluctance of US leadership in recognis-
ing any authority to judge American citizens over and above US laws. 
2 This is also a view echoed in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights issued 
by the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 19 September 1981 and the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam on 5 August 1990. 
3 Interestingly, the Grand Imam Sheikh Mohamed Sayed Tantawi of Al Azhar University 
in Egypt endorsed this position (Rakha 2005). 
